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À LA RECHERCHE DE BREYER PERDU
SHUBHA GHOSH*
I. INTRODUCTION
I remember first hearing of Judge Breyer’s nomination to the Supreme Court
at a dinner for the annual Law and Economics Association meeting served at a winery
up in Woodside, CA, on May 17, 1994. The then dean of the hosting law school made
the announcement during his welcoming remarks, describing Judge Breyer as the first
appointment to the Supreme bench from the law & economics school. I imagine,
although do not fully remember, some breast-beating over the disciplinary triumph
among the audience.
None of the press reports noted this milestone, however. Instead, the
newspaper articles touted Breyer as a military intelligence officer, Harvard Law
Professor, a noted federal jurist, a copyright scholar. A San Francisco paper talked
about his Bay Area roots, his undergraduate years at Stanford, and his reading of
Proust in high school in French.
If in fact he is the first law & economics scholar to sit on the Supreme Court,
he is a highly cultured one. His admiration for Proust has as much relevance as any
affiliation with Posner. A 2012 interview in the New York Review of Books focused on
Breyer’s love of Remembrance of Things Past.1 The same interview highlighted his
fandom for Stendahl, which has even more meaning with the gentle judge favoring the
austere black over the revolutionary red.2 But what may be Breyer’s strongest legacy
is the nostalgia of young Marcel for a more sane, elegant, and refined time that his
opinions evoke. Reading one of Breyer’s opinions is like biting into a lemony sponge
cake, taking us back to a time slipped away.

* © ORCID: 0000-0002-0316-1614. Crandell Melvin Professor of Law, Syracuse University
College of Law and Director, Intellectual Property and Technoloogy Comercialization Law Program
and Syracuse Intellectual Property Law Institute; for those who find this title pretentious, just think
the “Summarize Proust” contest of Monty Python, accessible online through an easy search. Marcel
Proust’s title gets translated in English as Remembrance of Things Past and most recently as In
Search of Lost Time.
1 Stephen Breyer, interviewed by Ioanna Kohler, On Reading Proust, THE N.Y REV . (November
7, 2013), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/11/07/reading-proust/. Maybe Proust has a
previously unexamined influence on the law. For example, a few weeks before writing this essay, I
read an interesting passage in Professor Barbara Babcock’s memoirs, recounting how she spent a
vacation with her partner on a beach in Mexico, reading Proust to each other. See BARBARA BABCOCK,
FISH RAINCOATS: A WOMAN LAWYER’S LIFE 168 (2016) (“I recall sitting on a Mexican beach, weeping
over the death of Marcel’s mother” from the Remembrance of Things Past). References to Proust by
two prominent legal academics do not make a pattern. But it does make one think. Does Proust offer
some insight into legal thinking in the United States after World War Two more broadly? How about
the influence of other early Twentieth Century modernists, like James Joyce, who, for what it’s worth,
I prefer to Proust, or Virginia Woolf and John Dos Passos? See, e.g., THOMAS GREY, THE WALLACE
STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY (1991).
2 Id. (referring to Stendahl’s dedication of his work to the “happy few”).
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His 2021 decision in Google v. Oracle, for example, evokes debates from the
1990’s.3 Those in the know saw the continuation of the questions left open by the 1996
Lotus v. Borland decision.4 A deeper taste of Justice Breyer’s words brought one’s mind
back to Professor Breyer’s tenure piece on The Uneasy Case for Copyright,5 where he
declared a skepticism for software copyright, a declaration he implemented in the 2021
decision. In his own reminiscence of the tenure piece, fifty years later, Justice Breyer
concedes an indebtedness to the economic analysis of the law, as it was playing out in
1970’s era antitrust and in the emerging notion of how law affects transaction costs. 6
Perhaps he is a law & economics Justice, self-identified through his confession.
But his writings reveal not only a cultured law & economics thinker but also
one tempered by attention to facts on the ground and institutional detail. His
skepticism for copyright grew from a careful study of publishing practices and the
dynamics of the software industry. Copyright, he concluded, raised costs albeit with
attendant benefits. “Copyright is a tax on readers for the benefit of authors,” he quoted
Lord McCauley. And like a careful economist he assessed the costs and the benefits
and like a tempered jurist, he ventured to gauge the proportionality of cost to benefit.
Justice Breyer famously embraced a European style proportionality analysis to assess
the scope of rights. Perhaps this proportionality assess was more economic than
European.7
As we read Breyer’s opinion in the future, our nostalgia for his temperament
will sear even more deeply, much as we miss Justice Souter, or Justice Stevens, or
Justice Ginsburg, or Justice O’Connor (sometimes). Judging does not align with
political platforms, as Justice Breyer has often noted. But judging does occur in the
public sphere and cannot avoid touching on politics. Even if one sees the political
gamesmanship of the appointments post-2016 as an aberration, one might still doubt
that the politics dropped off once the Senate vote was tallied.8 Justice Breyer’s
retirement is bittersweet, but welcome, reviving the hope we had back when he and
Justice Ginsburg were the first Democratic appointments to the Court after nearly
thirty years, and the only ones for another sixteen. Now we can sit back and distill
what we have learned and hope to sustain. Here are some of the nuggets, each worthy
of an extensive article of its own.

Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996 ).
5 Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
6 Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Look Back Across Four Decades, 79 GEO .
WASH. L. REV. 1635 (2011).
7 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005) (stating that proportionality is just one of several
approaches a judge should pursue to preserve democratic values).
8 Breyer’s distancing of the Supreme Court from politics reflects his aestheticism, which he
shares with Proust. “So ‘little Proust’ is preserved from the political compromises which tarnished
the lustre of so many writers and philosophers in our century. This snobbish, fashionable, sickly
individual managed to preserve…his cult of art—art as a cult.” J ULIA KRISTEVA, PROUST AND THE
SENSE OF TIME 98 (1993). For a detailed criticism of Breyer’s view of politics and the Court, see
Laurence H. Tribe, Politicians in Robes, THE N.Y REV. OF BOOKS, March 10, 2022,
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2022/03/10/politicians-in-robes-justice-breyer-tribe/.
3
4
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II. BREYER’S WAY
Justice Breyer at his best was attentive to the consequences of legal rules and
judicial rulings.9 This attention to consequences is of greater impact than his call for
proportionality in rights enforcement (which often just led to extensive multifactor
tests seen in the next section on Eldred).10 In Qualitex,11 for example, Justice Breyer
emphasized the implications for trademark protection as applied to colors (such as the
UPS brown or the yellow-gold as applied to dry cleaning pads, the subject of the case).
Litigation over shades of colors that would inevitably lead to shades of gray in the
doctrine was just one of the concerns. Lack of judicial standards for telling the
difference between scarlet and crimson, or other close colors, was another.
The Qualitex opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, was a break from the
textualist approach, four years earlier in the Taco Cabana case,12 the watershed trade
dress case. While Breyer focused on the consequences of protecting certain aspects of
trade dress, namely color. White’s opinion in Taco Cabana asked whether trade dress
fit within the language of the Lanham Act, with the answer: yes, full stop. Litigation
over trade dress continued and trickled up to the Supreme Court once again four years
later in Samara Brothers,13 where Justice Scalia provided a compromise between the
broad textualist approach of Taco Cabana and the pronounced exception in Qualitex.
Justice Scalia’s opinion was a highwire act of common law judging avoiding both the
textualism of White and the consequentialism of Breyer to yield its own tertium quid.
But Breyer’s way did not vanish. In his 2013 Kirtsaeng decision,14 the question
of when a sale of a copyrighted work exhausts the copyright owner’s right to control
reselling arose. The specific issue was whether the exhausting sale had to occur within
the boundaries of the United States or could occur anywhere in the world. 15 Breyer’s
opinion highlighted examples of absurd results if the domestic sale rule was followed. 16
I can resell a copyrighted book that I bought in the United States without interference
from the copyright owner. But if I bought the same book in Canada or Mexico or
Germany, I could be barred from reselling. Now, Breyer reminds us, think of the
ubiquity of copyright protection that arises from ever present software. My Mercedes
is full of copyrighted computer programs. A domestic exhaustion rule would mean I
could resell my Mercedes only if bought in the United States but not if I flew to
Germany to buy it. Is there sense in that result? Breyer runs through a number of
examples, substituting the consumer product in question, to convince us that the rule
9 Although I do not discuss these cases in this essay, another important example of his attention
to consequences is Justice Breyer’s majority decision in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013),
which found an antitrust claim against a patent owner agreeing with a generic pharmaceutical
company to delay entry of a competing pharmaceutical. As I was drafting this essay, Justice Breyer
authored the majority opinion in Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennis & Muaritz, L.P., ruling that lack of
knowledge of copyright law as well as of facts could excuse errors in potentially invalid copyright
registrations. Justice Breyer’s analysis emphasized the implications of the ruling for authors and
creators trying to secure copyrights in their works. 142 S. Ct. 941 (2022).
10 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
11 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobs Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
12 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
13 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
14 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
15 Id. at 525.
16 Id. at 541–43.
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of domestic exhaustion makes no sense, with the rule of international exhaustion
leading to a more meaningful result.
Some may characterize this approach as result-oriented, inconsistent with the
rule of law. But Breyer is not substituting his own preferred result for the legal
methods of analogy, textual reading, and precedent. To peer into the possible
consequences of a proposed rule is not to supplant standard methods. Such an
approach illustrates the far-sightedness we expect from a judge. Reasoning against
legislation that was open ended, ever changing, and ambiguous, both in Qualitex and
in Kirtsaeng, Justice Breyer looked at the facts of the case, the scenarios presented by
attorneys and amici, and his own well-tuned judgement to reach a conclusion about
the more meaningful rules. This is consequentialism at its finest.
III. WITHIN A REGULATORY GROVE
Justice Breyer is noted for his work in administrative law and regulatory
theory. His Breaking the Vicious Circle17 is a criticism of administrative agencies and
was the target of criticism during his 1994 confirmation hearings.18 While Justice
Breyer shares some views with conservative critics of the administrative state,
particularly on the role of capture, he adopts a more constructive view of reforming the
administrative state than critics who seek to undermine its function through, for
example, doctrines like the non-delegation or the major question doctrine. His views
on the administrative law and regulation come across in two of his intellectual property
opinions, Aereo in 201419 and Eldred in 2003.20
Whether Aereo’s system of capturing television broadcasts for later viewing by
subscribers to the service constituted a public performance rested on arcane
construction of the words public and performance. The Second Circuit in a 2-to-1
opinion ruled that the rewatching was not public since the captured program was in
an individualized viewed domain.21 Judge Denny Chin dissented from the
intermediate court’s ruling and focused on the underlying technical elements of the
service which served to transmit the broadcasted programs to a public audience.
Justice Breyer’s opinion looked to the context of compulsory license for cable broadcast
to rule against Aereo. What the company provided was a workaround to a cable system
for broadcasting content, finding for Aereo would be an example of regulatory evasion.
The innovative company had to work within the existing regulatory structure
established by Congress, concluded Justice Breyer. In contrast, Justice Scalia
dissented in favor of Aereo. He reasoned that the cable provisions of the 1976 Copyright
Act applied to an actual cable system.22 Just because Aereo’s technology functioned
like cable did not bring it under the applicable regulations, which were enacted to
overrule Supreme Court precedent that a cable broadcast was not a public
performance.23 Since Aereo’s system functioned like cable but was not a cable
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993).
See Todd C. Zubler, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 8 HARV. J.
L. & TECH. 241 (1994) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993)).
19 Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014).
20 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
21 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
22 Aereo, 573 U.S. at 460.
23 Id.
17
18
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broadcast under the Copyright Act of 1976, Justice Scalia concluded from the Supreme
Court precedent that the transmission provided by Aereo would not be a public
performance.24
These three different approaches arose from the Aereo litigation, each resting
on different analogies. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion of course prevailed for the
conclusion that the provisions of the Copyright Act regulating cable applied to Aereo,
giving it the burden of working with the costly compulsory licensing system in order to
survive. Unlike the analyses of Judge Chin and Justice Scalia, which rested on facts
about the underlying technology, Justice Breyer’s rested on the existence of the
regulatory system created by copyright. Aereo’s attempt to circumvent the system
undermined Congress’ decision to bring certain types of broadcasts under a compulsory
license. Justice Breyer’s approach highlights copyright as a regulatory system, in this
case regulating the broadcast of copyrighted television content. Deference to Congress’
choices directed Justice Breyer to assess Aereo’s technology through the regulatory
lens.
Justice Breyer, however, rejected the stance of Congressional deference in his
dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft.25 At issue was Congress’ power to extend the copyright
term for already created works by twenty years.26 While the majority was generous in
its reading of the “limited times” language of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, Justice
Breyer would read the language of the Article, especially its directive to “promote
progress” as placing limitations on Congress’ regulatory powers.27 Here Justice Breyer
recognized the working of capture as existing copyright owners convinced Congress to
extend the term to benefit their interests at the expense of competitors and consumers.
Judicial intervention, Justice Breyer recognized, was needed to remedy the situation.
But the proposed remedy was not a naked limitation on Congressional power. Instead,
Justice Breyer turned to a balancing test that would compare the beneficial effects of
the legislation with its burden on speech. Multifactor tests tend to make one’s eyes roll,
especially some devised by Justice Breyer. But with Breyer, we see his embrace of
proportionality analysis come to life. His aim is to find the sweet spot between
deference to Congress and distrust of legislation that allows for scrutiny of regulation
consistent with the fulfillment of its desired ends.
One can question Breyer’s proposed balancing test in Eldred of course. Its
terms seem ad hoc, unpredictable, and perhaps even unworkable. But I would
commend the attempt to adopt a more nuanced view of legislation, in light of the
Justice’s own criticisms of the administrative state from Beyond the Vicious Circle.
Even more commendable is the recognition that copyright law, and intellectual
property more broadly, fits both within the contours of the administrative state and
within a broader tradition of regulating economic activity, here the activity of creation,
invention, and innovation. However, as the next section shows, Breyer can stumble
when he loses the balanced, proportional approach to legislative scrutiny. With his
confounding treatment of patentable and copyright subject matter, Justice Breyer’s
intellectual property jurisprudence runs away from the nuance.

Id.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
26 Id. at 192–93.
27 Id. at 243–44.
24
25
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IV. THE FUGITIVE
Courts have over time examined closely the question of exclusions from the
subject matter of patent and copyright. With respect to patent, the Supreme Court has
pronounced that patent grants can extend to everything under the sun made by man,
except for natural phenomenon, laws of nature, and abstract ideas.28 Against
legislative silence on patentable subject matter in the Patent Act, the Court turned to
a century’s worth of precedents to identity these three exceptions as a way to police
potential excesses of the United States Patent and Trademark Office in its grant of
patents and of the Federal Circuit in its review of patents and patent litigation. On the
copyright side, Congress expressly addressed exceptions to copyright subject matter
under Section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act.29 But this legislative language grew
out of the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden,30 and latter cases. This
1879 decision not only attempted to draw a boundary between copyright and patent,
but also introduced specific types of exclusions on copyright, ones based on use versus
expression, method versus communication, what something does versus what
something says.
Justice Breyer’s own contribution to patent and copyright subject matter has
been in part a muddle, in part a curiosity. His decision in Mayo v. Prometheus31 is
famously part of a tetralogy of Supreme Court decisions on patentable subject matter
in the fields of business methods, medical diagnostics, DNA sequences, and
information technology. On the surface the decision follows in line from precedent.
Justice Breyer concluded that a method of medical diagnosis was not patentable
because it was an abstract idea, excluded under prior rulings.32 But the line Breyer
drew between unpatentable abstraction and potentially patentable concreteness is
never made clear. His analysis seems to echo the exclusion from patenting of mental
steps. And that might have been a clearer approach. Instead, following the strict
language of prior Supreme Court cases, Justice Breyer was led to the category of
“abstract idea.” Yet one wonders when does a method not constitute an idea. After all
an invention is defined as a conception reduced to practice, in other words an idea
made concrete through implementation. The Court compounds the confusion in a
subsequent decision, applying Breyer’s approach in Mayo to a computer implemented
system of managing loans.33 What is frustrating is how the Court follows precedent to
obtain a result rather than examining the underlying policies for patentable subject
matter and its exclusions.
While Justice Breyer’s approach to patentable subject matter can be
understood through an adherence to precedent that ignores deference to Congressional
legislation, his approach to copyright subject matter is more byzantine. The majority
in Public.Resource.Org readily found that a state’s annotated code was not protected
by copyright under the government edicts doctrine, even when the annotations were

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2022).
30 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
31 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
32 Id. at 70–71.
33 Alice Corp v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
28
29
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created by a private entity.34 Legislation is legislation, ruled Justice Roberts and four
colleagues. But Justice Breyer joined the dissent and its concern that private drafters
might lose incentive to create the annotations absent copyright.35 The dissent
seemingly ignored the incentives provided by contract with the State to finance the
creation of code annotations. Such patronage was not enough and did not fall squarely
within the government edicts doctrine. Precedent obtained a bit more scrutiny in the
dissent than it did in the Mayo decision, where the categorial exclusion was readily, if
clumsily, applied. Of course, in this case, the Copyright Act itself was more ambiguous.
The legislation created an exclusion for federal government works and did not mention
works created by and for state governments. That silence perhaps allows for broader
application of copyright for state code. For Breyer, the case for copyright of annotated
code perhaps was not so uneasy.
Even more intriguing is Breyer’s treatment of software copyright in his opinion
in Google v. Oracle.36 While software is expressly granted copyright protection under
the statute, there are exclusions for features of software (methods, systems, processes)
expressly set forth in the statute. A key question on which certiorari was granted was
the scope of this exclusion for Application Programming Interfaces (“API’s”) that
Google had copied from Oracle’s code.37 But Breyer gave scant attention to this
question, stating that for the sake of argument he would assume that the API’s were
subject to copyright protection.38 Breyer’s opinion instead focused on the fair use
question (which I analyze in the next section). Perhaps the statutory analysis of the
exclusion was too difficult for the Court. After all, the Court had split evenly when the
question arose before. But in this iteration, Justice Breyer chose to defer to Congress’
broad conclusions about the copyrightability of software while ignoring the statutory
language on exclusions. As a matter of reaching the desired result, perhaps the focus
on fair use was a wiser analytical strategy. But to sidestep the copyright subject
matter, especially after the attention given to patent subject matter, was a
disappointment for followers of Justice Breyer’s opinions.
One might feel that once bitten with the patentable subject matter, Justice
Breyer and the Court may have been hesitant about addressing the copyright subject
matter question as to methods and processes. They are certainly aware of the academic
and practitioner criticisms of the Mayo and Alice decisions. But the hesitancy might
stem more from a desire not to upset the balance within the software industry by
opening the door for exclusions, despite Congress’ clear choices. Justice Breyer,
however, seems to have moved away from his emphasis on consequences, his
recognition of intellectual property as a regulatory scheme, and his stance towards
Congressional legislation. On the other, there are ways in which Justice Breyer
redeems himself in the Google decision, finding a more robust path in the statute to
assess software methods and processes.

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1503–04 (2020).
Id. at 1517.
36 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
37 Id. at 1197.
38 Id.
34
35
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V. TIME REGAINED
Consequentialist thinking, attention to facts, pursuing the implications of legal
rulings—the hallmarks of Justice Breyer’s intellectual property opinions at their
apex—converge in his Google v. Oracle opinion, one that implements the ideas about
software and copyright declared in his Uneasy Case for Copyright.39 Drawing on the
practices of programmers and the norms of computer science, Justice Breyer found the
path from which he strayed in his decisions on patent and copyright subject matter.
In the Google appeals, computer programmers advocated against
copyrightability of interfaces and in favor of fair use. Their brief submitted to the
Federal Circuit, as part of the intermediate appeal, represents a technocratic view of
software. Interoperability is the key concept. Code needs to be operable across
platforms and across uses in order to promote competition and to avoid creating
technological barriers that would require costly workarounds that can inhibit the flow
of information and technical progress. As their brief asserts:
Programmers are the immediate beneficiaries of this interoperability.
If their skill sets were not transferrable, they would have to start
learning from scratch every time they work in a new environment.
Software firms also benefit from this interoperability. If programmers’
skills were not portable, then firms would need to convince
programmers to learn a new toolset to work in a new environment,
leading to slower adoption and higher training costs. But consumers
are the ultimate beneficiaries of the interoperability of skills, as higher
training costs for programmers are passed on to them. Moreover, the
proliferation of programming environments enabled by the portability
of skills means more innovation, competition, and consumer choice.40
Program, software, code, technocratic artifacts whose value is gauged as instruments
to engineers support limitations on copyright, contrary to the rationalist’s projection
of software as an aesthetic abstraction. Copyright law and policy provides new domains
for debates among computer scientists.41
When seen through the lens of computer science, familiar legal arguments take
on an unappreciated edge. A rationalist view of the program abstracts from the
instrumentality of software, which serve engineering ends and the needs of problem
solving. The technocratic view adopts a more pragmatic and applied perspective on
software. But this view is also the subject of disciplinary criticism for reducing software
to mere tools as opposed to the subject of deeper scientific inquiry. To treat computer
science as about software as instrument would be to reduce astronomy to a field about
telescopes. Of course, telescopes are part of the field, but so are charting planetary
Breyer, supra note 5.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of
Google Inc. at 4, Oracle Am. Inc. v. Google Inc., 2017 WL 11180607 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 2017) (Nos.
2017-1118, 2017-1202).
41 The programmer position is grounded in network effects for copyright software, particularly on
interoperability grounds. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual
Property, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 219 (2019); Ariel Katz, A Network Effects Perspective on Software
Piracy, 55 U. OF TORONTO L. J.155 (2005).
39
40
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orbits, testing theories of physicists, and predicting cosmological phenomena.
Computer science as a scientific, empirical, and experimental discipline would need to
go beyond the rationalist and technocratic approaches. The program is neither an
abstraction nor a mere tool. It is, under the scientific view, an experiment, a tool for
testing theories, but also for developing new theories and approaches. Programming
operates in a broader world of big data, analytics, and artificial intelligence.
An initial assessment of the Google opinion supports a continuation of the
technocratic view of software. Justice Breyer adopts a view of software consistent with
that articulated by programmers in their earlier brief, as the following language from
his decision underscores:
[G]iven programmers’ investment in learning the Sun Java API, to
allow enforcement of Oracle's copyright here would risk harm to the
public. Given the costs and difficulties of producing alternative APIs
with similar appeal to programmers, allowing enforcement here would
make of the Sun Java API's declaring code a lock limiting the future
creativity of new programs. Oracle alone would hold the key. The result
could well prove highly profitable to Oracle (or other firms holding a
copyright in computer interfaces). But those profits could well flow
from creative improvements, new applications, and new uses
developed by users who have learned to work with that interface. To
that extent, the lock would interfere with, not further, copyright's basic
creativity objectives.42
Software as keys and locks that bind programmers fits within an instrumental view of
programs and an engineering view of programming. But the Court’s analysis is not
limited to these technocratic concerns. What is instructive from the majority opinion
is its engagement with the nature of the program.
Through its emphasis on fair use, however, the Court points towards a new
understanding of software copyright. What signals this new understanding is the
Court’s slight inversion of the four fair use factors. In order from the statute and from
the numerous fair use cases, the factors are: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2)
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of what was copied;
and (4) the potential market effects of the use.43 The Google Court, without
explanation, begins with the second factor. This is one indication that the Court was
to call attention to the ontological status of programs under copyright law. Another
indication is how the Court characterizes Google’s use of the software in question, as
described by the Court.
As measured by number of words and paragraphs, Justice Breyer’s analysis of
the nature of the copyrighted work is the longest part of his fair use analysis. What is
striking is his decompiling of Congress’ definition of copyright:
Congress has specified that computer programs are subjects of
copyright. It differs, however, from many other kinds of copyrightable
computer code. It is inextricably bound together with a general system,
42
43

Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1208.
Id. at 1196–97.
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the division of computing tasks, that no one claims is a proper subject
of copyright.44
Programs are distinct from code and each fit into a broader general system for the
tasks of computing. Copyright applies to some but not others, Justice Breyer states, on
the surface contradicting his initial assumption that the software at issue is
copyrighted. But this seeming contradiction is resolved by shifting from a focus on
program as language to a focus on the programming system of which the language is
only one part. What distinguishes the analysis from a rationalist or technocratic view
of software is moving beyond the program as aesthetic abstraction and program as an
instrument for computing. There is a holistic view that posits a deeper, empirical view
of software.
This new approach to software is further illustrated by the deft way in which
Justice Breyer introduces the functional aspects of software: the copied declaring code
and the uncopied implementing programs call for, and reflect, different kinds of
capabilities. A single implementation may walk a computer through dozens of different
steps. To write implementing programs, witnesses told the jury, requires balancing
such considerations as how quickly a computer can execute a task or the likely size of
the computer's memory. One witness described that creativity as “magic” practiced by
an API developer when he or she worries “about things like power management” for
devices that “run on a battery.”45 This is the very creativity that was needed to develop
the Android software for use not in laptops or desktops but in the very different context
of smartphones.
Although the Court declined to address the question of copyrightability of
interfaces, the functionality of interfaces is introduced in the fair use analysis through
the word “capabilities.”46 What is notable is that the functionality analysis is
distinguishable from the technocratic approach of the Altai court.47 Justice Breyer does
not engage in technical filtering or dissection of the program. Instead, the focus is on
the empirical realities of what the relevant code can do. These capabilities define the
“nature of the work,” the meaning of the program. Within this understanding of the
work at issue, Justice Breyer progresses to assess the purpose of the use, the
substantiality of what was copied, and the market effects.
Where will the fair use analysis lead? What has been regained? Litigants will
draw on Justice Breyer’s words from the legacy set in his Google opinion.
VI. MEMORIES AND LEGACIES
Even though Justice Breyer announced his retirement too recently to speak in
nostalgic terms, the cataclysmic changes in the orientation of the Court and the
political environment makes Justice Breyer’s influence seem so distant. Labels like
liberal, conservative, and radical seem elusive and disproportionate to the normative
concerns underlying the rights and powers we have learned to expect in our democracy.
Breyer’s legacy, presented in this essay, is the necessity of memory, or engaging in law
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
46 Id.
47 Comput. Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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through the range of disciplines, economics, literature, politics. Memory revives and
energizes our commitments, and we should not forget the complexity of Justice
Breyer’s engagement with intellectual property.48

But we should always be mindful of how memories can pay tricks on us. “As Proust insisted,
the remembrance of things past is not necessarily the remembrance of things as they were.” JONAH
LEHRER, PROUST WAS A NEUROSCIENTIST 95 (2007).
48

